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Prejudiced by the Presence of God:
Keeping Religious Material Out of
Death Penalty Deliberations
Terrence T. Egland*
"Like manytouched bythis case, I have sought guidance through prayer. I have
concluded judgment about the heart and soul of an individual on death row are
best left to a higher authority."
- Governor George W. Bush'
L Imnaion
The stakes are exceedingly high in cases involving the imposition of the
death penalty. So high, in fact, that the United States Supreme Court has de-
creed that when it comes to examining the imposition of the ultimate punish-
ment, "death is different."2 Being different, special questions are raised when
examining the role of the jury and the method by which it reaches its verdict.
The jury, occupying an exalted position in the American justice system as an
independent and unbiased finder of fact, is protected byan elaborate set of rules
and common law principles.' The jury system, however, is not perfect. Some
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especiallyJanice Kopec and Meghan Morgan, whose dedication and willingness to help never ceases
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years of questionable decisions and aimless wanderings.
1. Michael Graczyk, Teas Exe Kara Tudee. Tecas Gou Geor Bh and the US. Sup
Coar Rsad to Sto the Exwaiti YoRK DAILY REC, Feb. 4, 1998, at A4, atuda& aT 1998 WL
6211038. This line was delivered bythen-Texas Governor George W. Bush in an announcement
denying Karla Faye Tucker's request for a pardon. Id Governor Bush concluded by saying, "May
God bless Karla Faye Tucker and God bless her victims and their families." Id
2. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,188 (1976) (pluralityopinion) (citing Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972)) (recognizing "that the penaltyof death is different in kind from anyother
punishment imposed under our system of criminal justice").
3. Sw Gregory M. Ashley, Note, Tlklogin d JwyRowr R&gkaeDis wssionas "Extwana
Maeria"in the CauseqCa Punikr amvLii ad , 55 VAND. L.REV. 127,136 (2002) ("The jury
system is ingrained in the American criminal forum to such a degree that administering our criminal
law system without it is unthinkable." (internal quotation marks omitted)). The United States
Supreme Court, through a long line of cases, has protected the primacy of the jury as finder of fact
except in the two following instances: (1) the presence of extraneous material in deliberations; and
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of the issues troubling the jury system as a whole include juror
miscomprehension of law and fact, racial bias, wrongful convictions, and faulty
jury instructions.4
One area of special concern is the reliance by the jury during capital sen-
tencing deliberations on extraneous religious material, most notably the Bible.
A recent and controversial example of this phenomenon is the case of Pe0p/e v
Haran,5 which garnered national attention in the summer of 2003.6 Robert
Harlan ("Harlan") was convicted in a Colorado state court for the kidnapping,
rape, and murder of Rhonda Maloney, the circumstances of which the trial judge
found to be "among the most grievous, heinous and reprehensible this Court in
its 18-year judicial career has ever had occasion to review."' During Harlan's
sentencing proceeding, two jurors researched biblical passages for guidance
during a nightly recess from deliberations.' When sentencing deliberations
resumed the next day, at least one Bible made its way into the jury room with
several other jurors possessing notes from the previous night's study.9 Biblical
passages were read aloud in the jury room, most importantly Romans 13:1 and
Leviticus 24:20-21.o The selected passages mandated that believers trust in the
(2) outside influence on the jury. SeeParker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 365 (1966) (finding outside
influence when the bailiff commented to the juryon the convictabilityof the defendant); McDonald
v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264,266-68 (1915) (holding that jurors maynot impeach their verdict byevidence
that it was a quotient verdict); Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 149 (1892) (holding that jurors
may not testify so as to impeach their verdict except to testify as to any fact showing the existence
of an extraneous influence); FED. K, EVlD. 606(b) (governing the inquiry into whether a jury
considered improper material or was subjected to outside influence).
4. Ashley, supra note 3, at 139 (noting that "the courtroom and the death penalty trial,
combined with the 'mystifying language of legal fornality,' may distort the moral sense of a juryin
its effort to reach a justifiable sentencing decision"). Ashley noted a report by the U.S. General
Accounting Office to the Senate and House Committees on the Judiciary, published in 1990, that
concluded that in cases in which a black defendant is on trial for killing a white victim there is a
higher likelihood that the defendant will be sentenced to death. Id Ashley also discussed the
difficulty jurors have when considering mitigating and aggravating factors during capital sentencing
as well as their misapprehension of jury instructions. Id
5. No. 94 CR 187 (Adams Co., Clo. Dist. Ct. May 23, 2003).
6. See People v. Harlan, No. 94 CR 187 (Colo. Dist. Ct. May23, 2003) (on file with author)
(reversing death sentence due to the use of the Bible in jury deliberations); Sue Lindsay, Had=
Serer Tase" iers Dath Pnslty Thmnm (at BcaseroeJwws Used Bibla, ROCKY MTN. NEws, May
24, 2003, at 4A, at 2003 WL 6364306.
7. Haria, No. 94 CR 187, at 33; Lindsay, s"pra note 6, at 4A.
8. Lindsay, supra note 6, at 4A. Several of the jurors testified at an evidentiary hearing on
the matter that they used the Bible available at the hotel where theywere sequestered. Id Another
juror testified that her parents brought her personal study Bible to the hotel. Id
9. d
10. See Rw 13:1 (King James) ("Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers. For
there is no power but of God: the powers that be are ordained of God."); Leitiwa 24:20-21 (King
James) ("Breach for Breach, eye for eye, tooth for tooth: as he hath caused a blemish in a man, so
shall it be done to him agzin And he that killeth a beast, he shall restore it: and he that killeth a
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law of the government, the government having been appointed byGod, and that
anyone who takes another's life must forfeit his life."
After holding an evidentiary hearing, Judge John J. Vigil ("Judge Vigil")
ordered that Harlan be resentenced due to the jury's inappropriate use of biblical
texts to guide its verdict. 2 Judge Vigil found that the biblical passages referenced
by the jurors "not only encouraged the death penalty but required that it be
imposed when another life is taken."" Because the jurors were left with no
discretion bythe selected passages, under Colorado law there was "a reasonable
possibility that the jurors' exposure to these biblical passages affected one or
more juror's decision to return the death penalty verdict.""
This article will first provide an explanation of whyreligious material should
be excluded from the jury room in capital punishment deliberations. 5 Second,
this article will provide an overview of the common law rules in Virginia for
determining whether a jury was influenced by extraneous material. 6 Third, an
outline of the traditional methods for limiting the possibility of religion-based
verdicts will be offered.17 Emphasis will be placed on the procedural mecha-
nisms of a jurytrial as well as post-verdict direct attacks under the Sixth Amend-
ment guarantee of an impartial jury and the Eighth Amendment prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment. Finally, this article will explore the
viability of challenging religion-based verdicts under the Establishment Clause
of the First Amendment. 9
II WbyRdigoums Matorl SlxuldBe Exdudedfim&theJury Room
At the outset, it might not be entirely clear uSy a capital defense attorney
would want to exclude religious material from the jury room.2" After all, the
man, he shall be put to death.").
11. Ha/tan No. 94 CR 187, at 29.
12. Id at 33; Lindsay, s"pm note 6, at 4A.
13. Hadi No. 94 CR 187, at 29.
14. Id The court cited the test in Wiser v. People, 732 P.2d 1139, 1143 (Colo. 1987) (en
banc), holding that the objective test for determining ifa new trial should be granted is" 'whether
there is a reasonable possibilitythat the verdict was tainted by the introduction of outside informa-
tion or influence into the jury deliberations."' Haran, No. 94 CR 187, at 28 (alteration in original)
(quoting Wiser, 732 P.2d at 1142).
15. Swe eina Part H.
16. See ihf-a Part III.
17. See i ra Part IV.
18. Id
19. Sw iizia Part V.
20. It is also worth noting that this article deals with the exclusion and review of cases in
which the actual physical religious text was the source of the influence and not religious discussion
in general. For an argument advocating for the treatment of religious discussion in general as
2004]
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Bible contains many merciful and "defense friendly' passages that can be found
amongst the fire and brimstone requirement of an "eye for eye, tooth for
tooth."2 Nonetheless, controlling which passages that a juryperuses is beyond
the ability of anyone not in the jury room itself. Without this ability, the safest
and surest way to eliminate the pro-death passages is to throw out the pro-life
passages as well Seeking the exclusion of religious texts from the jury room
during deliberations does not equate to a prohibition against religiously based
arguments at trial.22 Exclusion of religious material from the jury room simply
mitigates the prejudicial effect that biblical passages and other religious texts can
have on the outcome in capital cases.23 There are several compelling reasons
why the exclusion of religious material is important and should be pursued by
the capital defense attorney.
A. 7h Bie, Koran, and txrRduzgxw Texts A elnasistent Somes qCLaw
Unlike state and federal law, religious law is temporally fixed from the
moment that it is written. When society evolves and social mores become less
or more stringent, legislatures and courts are able to pass new legislation or
render legal decisions that adapt the civil law to the changing culture. As Justice
Brennan opined:
[T]he Constitution is not a static document whose meaning on every
detail is fixed for al time by the life experience of the Framers. We
have recognized in a wide variety of constitutional contexts that the
practices hat were in place at the time any particular guarantee was
enacted into the Constitution do not necessailyfix forever the mean-
ing of that guarantee. To be truly faithful to the Framers, "our use of
extraneous material, sweimtnay Ashley, spr note 3.
21. CxnpvrRcrrns 12:17-19 (King James) ("Recompense to no man evil for evil. Provide
things honest in the sight of all men. If it be possible, as much as lieth in you, live peaceably with
all men. Dearly beloved, avenge not yourselves, but ndvr give place unto wrath: for it is written,
Vengeance is mine; I will repay, saith the Lord."), uithExdum 21:23-25 (King James) ("And if any
mischief follow, then thou shalt give life for life, Eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot
for foot, burning for burning, wound for wound, stripe for stripe."), and Gois 9:5-6 (King James)
("And surely your blood of your lives will I require; at the hand of every beast will I require it, and
at the hand of man; at the hand of every man's brother will I require the life of man. Whoso
sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed: for in the image of God made he man.").
SeegaMyJill Jones, Comment, 7he Cbsth nExeaiwr Rexrzitig "A nEyeforA nEe"u idtb "Twn
the Od>-r Clmk, -27 PEPP. L. REv. 127 (1999) (discussing the positions on the death penalty found
in the Old and New Testaments).
22. For a discussion of the use of religious arguments during closing argument, se bfia Part
IV.B.2.
23. Se eg, Haran, No. 94 CR 287, at 33 (reversing death sentence and ordering a new trial
based on the jurors' use of the Bible to determine penalty); Grooms v. Commonwealth, 756 S.W.2d
131,145 (Ky. 1988) (Stephens, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("What the Bible says
about the appropriateness of a death penalty in a particular case is not a legitimate concern of a
penalty phase jury.").
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the history of their time must limit itself to broad purposes, not
specific practices."24
Although an argument still ferments over whether the original intent of the
Framers should control current constitutional interpretation, there can be no
doubt that our form of government and the laws promulgated under it are
adaptable and amenable to changing times.
For the most part, religious texts are not temporally adaptable as are the
Constitution, statutory law, and the common law.2" From the moment that the
original text for Leviticus 24:20-21 was promulgated as a part of Jewish law, the
penalty for taking someone's eye was the taking of the offender's eye. 6 How-
ever, although religious texts are not amendable, they are subject to interpreta-
tion by any number of ministers, rabbis, and imams, each of whom potentially
could advocate a different interpretation. Indeed, twelve Christian jurors could
have twelve different interpretations of a particular Biblical passage or rely on
anynumber of different passages to find support for, or opposition to, the death
penalty. 27 The same critique applies to the Koran, which is itself subject to
widelyvaried interpretation. 28 The flexible nature of religious legal interpretation
makes it unsuitable for application in the modem American justice system
However valuable the teachings and mandates of the Bible or other sacred texts
in the personal lives of church members, the one-size-fits-all nature of the
retributive justice found in Christian, Jewish, and Islamic law has no place in the
application of constitutional, statutory, and common law.
24. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 US. 783,816 (1983) (Brennan,J., dissenting) (quoting Abington
Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 US. 203, 241 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
25. One prominent exception is the Roman Catholic Church, which publishes Papal
teachings and official church positions as modifications to the official church interpretation of the
Bible. SwJones, s"pra note 21, at 131 ("Unlike papal teachings and official church positions, the
biblical text has not changed much in the seven hundred plus years since ... [Thomas] Aquinas'
death.").
26. Letia6,24:20-21 (KingJames) ("[E]ye foreye, tooth for tooth.... ").
27. Ashley, su"ra note 3, at 152-53. Ashley states:
Althougah some posit religious justifications for abolishing the death penalty, countless
others base their competing arguments in favor of the punishient on religious
gounds as well. The utmte victor in a specific capital punishment deliberation mna
Fall on either side of the dichotomy, yet only the latter perspective has the potenM
actually to end an individual's life.
Id
28. Seth Stevenson,/almA Peu Rdo Ger W BhbSSa Yis, CkamBinLadm Sa)s
Na Wbos Rig, at http://slate.msn.com/id/117525 (last modified Oct. 24, 2001) ("Anydebate
based on Quranic [interpretation] could go back and forth forever without end."). Stevenson wrote
this comment in the context of a discussion of whether or not Islam promotes violence, but the
basic thrust of his comment applies equally to legal interpretations.
2004]
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B. Cwat q'a Ph ha 1 Stad-Off
If religious texts are allowed in the jury room during sentencing delibera-
tions, is a juror allowed to consider anymoral philosophy as a basis for sentenc-
ing the defendant? Imagine that an atheist is chosen for one of the twelve seats
in a capital trial. After having found the defendant guilty, the jury retires to the
jury room to begin deliberations. After another juror has produced a Bible and
quoted scripture in support of the death penalty, the atheist refers to a pocket
volume of the works of Gandhi in an effort to persuade fellow jurors to vote for
life. The atheist would expound on Gandhi's theory of nonviolence and his
belief that "wherever you are confronted with an opponent, conquer him with
love."29 Clearly, a fundamentalist who is an avowed believer of the "eye for eye"
philosophy would have a difficult time reasoning with a follower of Gandhi's
philosophy.
This exchange could lead to a philosophical stand-off with jurors debating
justifications for or against the death penaltyrather than the evidence and law of
the case. The result is ineffectual jury deliberations and a breakdown of the
entire jury system. Moreover, the jury is deliberating whether or not to impose
the death penalty in a particular case, but the actual debate over the validity of
the death penalty has already occurred in the state or federal legislature with an
answer in the affirmative." The only job for the jury is to determine if that
particular defendant is deserving of the ultimate punishment provided under the
applicable civil law.
IIL TheLawqfExtraneous Evzidencez Vigwzna.A Ccv LawA side
Before a discussion of the larger federal constitutional questions, it is
prudent to explore the law concerning extraneous material as it now exists under
the Virginia common law. The Commonwealth of Virginia, as Justice Compton
made clear, "has been more careful than most states to protect the inviolability
and secrecy of jury deliberations, adhering to the general rule that the testimony
of jurors should not be received to impeach their verdict, especially on the
ground of their own misconduct."31 Further, the Supreme Court of Virginia has
29. Mohandas K. Gandhi MyFaizh inNon Vido inSoCAL AND POuTICAL PHILOSOPHY
542 (John Sommerville & Ronald E. Santoni eds., Doubleday 1963).
30. Se, eg, VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-31 (Michie Supp. 2003) (providing the death penalty in
the Commonwealth of Virginia as an available penalty for capital murder if an aggravating factor
has been proven).
31. Kasi v. Commonwealth, 508 S.E.2d 57,67 (Va. 1998), wt denia 527 U.S. 1038 (1999);
see Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Hulvey, 353 S.E.2d 747, 750 (Va. 1987) (stating the general rule that
testimonyindicating juror misconduct should not be received to impeach the jury's verdict); Phillips
v. Campbell, 104 S.E.2d 765,768 (Va. 1958) ("It has long been settled in Virginia that the affidavits
or the testimony of jurors to impeach their own verdicts are to be received with great caution and
only in exceptional cases, and in order to prevent a failure of justice."); Bull v. Commonwealth, 55
Va. (14 Gratt.) 613, 632 (1857) ("[The testimony of jurors ought not to be received to impeach
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limited the investigation into allegations of juror misconduct to events that
occurred outside the jury room_32 Thus, a Virginia court cannot inquire into a
jury's misbehavior if the conduct was confined to the jury room?3  The rule
against permitting juror testimonyto impeach a verdict exists primarilyto ensure
the finality of verdicts, but is also justified as a means to limit post-trial harass-
ment of jurors and promote frank discussion in the jury room?4 Justice
O'Connor of the United States Supreme Court has expressed concerns that an
effort to perfect the jury system by conducting postverdict investigations might
reveal improper juror behavior, but it might also destroythe jury system itself."
There are, however, exceptions to the general rule against peering into jury
deliberations.
The Virginia courts allow an exception for cases in which jurors received
and considered extraneous material during deliberations. 6 In the case of extra-
neous material, testimony from jurors is appropriate and required to investigate
adequatelythe alleged misconduct because "there is strong public policy and legal
precedent which mandates the interrogation of jurors to determine if an impro-
priety has tainted the verdict."37 Jury consideration of evidence not presented
at trial violates public policy because a defendant has a right to confront the
witnesses arrayed against him, and its consideration violates the rule against the
presentation of hearsay evidence. 8 Even if misconduct is shown to have oc-
their verdict, especially on the ground of their own misconduct."); Butler v. Commonwealth, 525
S.E.2d 58, 61 (Va. C. App. 2000) (finding that the trial court did not err in refusing to examine
jurors upon allegations of juror misconduct because the alleged conduct was confined to the jury
room and there were no allegations that extraneous material was injected into the deliberations);
Evans-Smithv. Commonwealth, 361 S.E.2d 436,447 (Va. Ct. App. 1987) (finding reversible error
when an almanac not entered into evidence or judicially noticed was in part the basis for a jury's
conviction of the defendant).
32. See CterpiTW Traor Ca, 353 S.E.2d at 751 (Generally, we have limited findings of
prejudicial juror misconduct to activities of jurors that occur outside the jury room.").
33. Id (citing Phils, 104 S.E.2d at 767-68).
34. E tam-Snitr, 361 S.E.2d at 446; sw also Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 119-20
(1987) (stating reasons for the "necessity of shielding jury deliberations from public scrutiny').
35. Tanner, 483 U.S. at 120.
36. SeeEws-Snizb, 361 S.E.2d at 446 (finding reversible error in a case in which a juror
researched an almanac for the time of sunset and the jury used that information in convicting the
defendant).
37. Id
38. Id; see U.S. CONST. amend. VI ('In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoythe
right to... be confronted with the witnesses against him."); 19 MICHE'S JURISPRUDENCE, Verdict
S 34 (2003) ("An exception to the general rule limiting post-verdict examination of jurors is
recognized when it appears that matters not in evidence may have come to the attention of one or




cuffed during deliberations, a defendant must prove that he was prejudiced as a
result of the alleged misconduct."'
A. FiigMi rai,,u
The first step in seeking a remedy for the jury's use of extraneous material
is making a showing that the juror misconduct actually occurred.0 For the
reasons mentioned above, Virginia guards the door to the jury room with
extraordinarycare' However, there are circumstances in which peering into the
juryroom for improprietyis important and necessary. InEzmn-SnithvCbnm
wdtJ, 42 which involved a home invasion robbery, the defendant claimed that the
actual perpetrators were seen by him, with the aid of his vehicle's headlights,
outside his home approximately 300 to 400 feet away at 5:00 a.m.43 Just days
after the jury rendered a verdict of guilty, a juror came forward explaining how
another juror had consulted an almanac outside the jury room to determine the
time of sunrise on the day in question to aid in the jury's assessment of the
defendant's credibility.' The juror who consulted the almanac reported his
findings to the other members of the jury, and the jury, in part, based its decision
to convict the defendant on the fact that the sun, according to the almanac, had
already risen when the defendant said he had turned on his headlights.45 The
trial court denied Evans-Smith's motion to set aside the verdict on the ground
that a juror should not be allowed to impeach the jury's verdict based on its own
misconduct. 6
The E'um-Sni h court relied on Ccmwnia Unxnlmranxe Co v M=OW,
in which the Supreme Court of Virginia outlined the procedure for dealing with
allegations of juror misconduct. When the issue of juror misconduct is raised,
"the trial court has the affirmative duty 'to investigate the charges and to
ascertain whether or not, as a matter of fact, the jurywas guilty of such miscon-
39. S& Frazier v. Beard, 201 F. Supp. 395, 396 (W.D. Va. 1962) ("Before a verdict or
judgment can be set aside because of misconduct of the juryin the jury room, it must affirmatively
appear that the substantial rights of the complaining party have been prejudiced thereby.").
40. SaeEn.Srtin, 361 S.E.2d at 446 (stating that the court has a duty" 'to investigate the
charges and to ascertain whether or not, as a matter of fact, the jury was guilty of such
misconduct' ").
41. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
42. 361 S.E.2d 436 (Va. Cc. App. 1987).
43. Ewmu-Snitd, 361 S.E.2d at 445.
44. Id
45. Id
46. Id at 446. The trial court based its determination on Budl v mmzld'th. See Bu, 55
Va. (14 Gratt.) at 632 (concluding that a juror who alleges jury misconduct is subject to heightened
scrutiny and treated with great caution).
47. 343 S.E.2d 329 (Va. 1986).
48. Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Moorefield, 343 S.E.2d 329, 333 (Va. 1986).
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duct.' - In conducting its investigation, the trial court may call jurors to the
stand "to testify under oath in open court and to answer relevant questions
propounded by the court and counsel about what had transpired."" Allowing
jurors to testifyconcerning misconduct is an exception to the general rule against
accepting testimony to impeach a jury's verdict."' Further, testifying jurors are
not allowed" 'to explain their verdict by stating the reasons upon which their
conclusions are based,"' but must limit their testimony to the alleged miscon-
duct.5 2
The E uvm-Snith court applied these principles and found that the trial court
abused its discretion and violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment guarantee
to an impartial jury when it refused to investigate the alleged juror misconduct
based on the affidavits of eight jurors affirming that misconduct occurred. 3 The
court found that the alleged misconduct was proper grounds for further investi-
gation because the alleged misconduct did not involve an exploration of the
juror's mental processes, a prohibited form of inquiry, but rather the effect
outside evidence had on the juror's mental processes. 4 The court then consid-
ered whether the defendant was prejudiced by the alleged misconduct.5
B. DwjucT N
In Virginia, a juror's use of extraneous material will be found to be harmless
error unless "there is sufficient ground to believe that... an accused.., has
been prejudiced by receipt of the information." 6 The E ns.-Srith court found
49. Id (quoting Kearns v. Ha]], 91 S.E.2d 648,653 (Va. 1956)); seealoHaddad v. Common-
wealth, 329 S.E.2d 17,20 (Va. 1985) (finding that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to
investigate a juror who expressed bias to a third party during tria . The Emw-Snith court noted
that affidavits alone cannot support a claim of juror misconduct, but the affidavits can serve as
cause for the trial court to investigate further. Ewn;-Snith, 361 S.E.2d at 447.
50. Commil Uio Ir. Ca, 343 S.E.2d at 333 (citing Dozier v. Morrisette, 92 S.E.2d 366,
368 (Va. 1956)).
51. Id
52. Id (quoting Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Mapp, 37 S.E.2d 23, 28 (Va. 1946)). The
prohibition against searching the juror's minds for the rationale for their verdict is similar to that
found in Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), which provides that a juror may not testify concerning
matters "occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon
that or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the
verdict or indictment or concerning the juror's mental processes in connection therewith." FED.
R EviD. 606(b).
53. Era-Snit, 361 S.E.2d at 448.
54. Id
55. Id
56. Brittle v. Commonwealth, 281 S.E.2d 889, 890 (Va. 1981); swalso H-iton v. Gallagher,
57 S.E.2d 131,136 (Va. 1950) ("One essential concept of a fair trial is that no outside influence shall
be brought to bear upon the jury, and that no evidence shall be considered bythem other than that
2004]
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that the test for determining prejudice" 'is not whether the jurors were actually
prejudiced... but whether they might have been so prejudiced.' "" Moreover,
the court found that the production of even " 'slight evidence of influence or
prejudice'" warrants a new trial."8
The E wns-Snith court, in considering the prejudicial effect the sunrise data
from the almanac had on the verdict, concluded that the inappropriate evidence
held a great probability of prejudice to the defendant because it "went to an
ultimate issue in the case."59 Evans-Smith's credibility was called into question
by the almanac information; therefore, "it was absolutely essential that [he] be
given an opportunityto confront and cross-examine this evidence against him_" 60
Further, in light of the eight affidavits alleging misconduct and probable preju-
dice, the trial court erred in not conducting an investigation to collect the testi-
monyof the remaining four jurors regarding the alleged misconduct.61 The court
reversed Evans-Smith's conviction and remanded the case for a new trial.62
IV. Traditonl Ojetiom and Direct A trades on RdeigrmBasai Death Seawewvx
A. Proxa al Meoanisrr to Pw&ent ReigmrBased Dah Senteim
Prior to anydirect challenges to jurymisconduct during capital punishment
sentencing deliberations, there are ways to mitigate the effects that religion can
have on the outcome of a criminal trial.63 Several stages of the jury trial offer
opportunities to set roadblocks to limit the intrusion of religious dogma into the
confines of the jury room. These opportunities present themselves during voir
dire, closing argument, and jury instructions.
1. Voir Dire
The voir dire process provides the capital defense attomeywith an opportu-
nityto shield his client from judgment byjurors who would be likelyto vote for
death based on their religious convictions. The United States Supreme Court
presented and admitted on the trial of the case."); Crockett v. Commonwealth, 47 S.E.2d 377,386
(Va. 1948) ("It is always improper for a juror to discuss a cause which he is trying as a juror or to
receive any information about it except in open court and in the manner provided by law...."
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
57. Evzwi-Snith, 361 S.E.2d at 447 (quoting Thompson v. Commonwealth, 70 S.E.2d 284,
290 (Va. 1952)).
58. Id (quoting Cmxku; 47 S.E.2d at 386).




63. For a discussion concerning how to mount a direct challenge against a religion-based
verdict, sw iqa Part I.B.
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ruled in Batson v KerMuck9 4 that it is constitutionally impermissible to use a
peremptory strike to remove potential jurors based on their race.65 Batson has
been extended also to prevent the peremptorystrike of potential jurors based on
gender.66 However, it is still unclear whether the Batson principles apply to a
potential juror's religion.67 In State v Daus,68 the Supreme Court of Minnesota
refused to extend Batson to peremptory strikes based on religion.69 In a 7-2
decision, the United States Supreme Court refused to issue a writ of certiorari.7
Justice Ginsburg, concurring in the denial, noted the Supreme Court of Minne-
sota's observation that race- and gender-based peremptory strikes, forbidden
under Batson, are more self-evident and more readilyascertained during voir dire
than are religion-based strikes.71 This recognition indicates that the Court will
extend the Batson rationale onlyto cases in which peremptorystrikes are used to
vet potential jurors based on outwardlyascertainable criteria. The Court's refusal
to take up the case arguably renders Batson challenges to religion-based strikes
illegitimate and allows a capital defense attomeyperemptorilyto strike potential
jurors if it becomes apparent that their religious views would make them more
likely than not a pro-death juror.
Other courts have come to different conclusions than the court in Daus.
Two United States Courts of Appeals have visited the issue and found that Batson
does prevent counsel from using a peremptory strike based on religious affilia-
tion. However, these courts suggested that strikes may be used on
64. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
65. Se U.S. CONT. amend. XIV, 5 1 (stating in pertinent part that "[n]o State shall... deny
to anyperson within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws"); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
79, 89 (1986) (holding that it is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to strike a potential juror based on race).
66. SeJ.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 US. 127, 128-29 (1994) (extending the rationale of Batsonto
peremptory strikes based on gender).
67. Sw United States v. DeJesus, 347 F.3d 500, 509-10 (3d Gr. 2003) (holding that a
peremptorystrike based on a potential juror's religious beliefs is not unconstitutional); United States
v. Brown, 352 F.3d 654, 668 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating that "[rleligion, like race and gender, is an
'impermissible consideration' in government decision-making," but striking a juror because of
religious activities does not violate Batso. It remains an open question whether the United States
Supreme Court will take up the Second and Third CGrcuit's challenge and resolve the issue. At least
one state court has found that Bason does apply to religion-based peremptory challenges. Se
People v. Martin, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 147, 151 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that Batson applies to
religion-based challenges).
68. 504 N.W.2d 767 Mln 1993).
69. State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767, 771 (Minn. 1993).
70. Davis v. Minnesota, 511 U.S. 1115, 1115 (1994) (mem.) (refusing to grant a writ of
certiorari to decide a case allowing peremptory strikes of venirepersons based on their religion).
71. Id at 1115 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
72. SeeDeisw, 347 F.3d at 509-10 (finding that "[t]he distinction drawn bythe District Court
between a strike motivated by religious beliefs and one motivated byreligious affiliation is valid and
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venirepersons who engage in particular religious activities that indicate inordi-
nately strong beliefs- beliefs counsel views as bearing on their suitability as
jurors. In United State v Deeus,73 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit held that although Batson prevented the exclusion of jurors based
solely on their religious affiliation, the peremptory strikes did not violate Batson
if they were exercised to exclude a potential juror due to heightened religious
activities indicating strong beliefs that would prevent an unbiased verdict." The
jurors in question in Dejsus were struck based on their responses to a jury
questionnaire." The heightened religious activities that the court considered
proper grounds for dismissal included: (1) civic activities with a church; (2)
reading the CbristianBooe DisptdOr, (3) holding several biblical degrees; (4) being
a deacon and Sunday School teacher, (5) serving as an officer and trustee in a
church; (6) reading the Bible and related literature; (7) and stating that their sole
76hobbies are church activities.
In the case of UnitBdStats v B7VUr-4 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit came to a similar, if more limited, conclusion as the court in
Dej~Jes.7" The Broum court reasoned that "[r]eligion, like race and gender, is an
'impermissible consideration' in government decision-making" and therefore
religion-based strikes violate the Equal Protection (lause principles represented
by the decision in Batson 9 However, the court did not base its decision on the
same distinction between affiliation and belief as did the DeJesus court; rather, the
court held that "differentiating among prospective jurors on the basis of their
activities does not plainlyiniplicate the same unconstitutional proxies as distinc-
tions based solely on religious identity.""0 The facts in Brosn did not implicate
the affiliation/belief distinction because at trial the prosecutor explained his
strikes in terms of the jurors' activities alone and not on the strong beliefs that
such activities represented."
proper"); Broom 352 F.3d at 668 (stating that "[rieligion, like race and gender, is an 'impermissible
consideration' in government decision-making," but striking a juror because of religious activities
does not violate Batscn). The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit addressed the
issue in dictum and expressed a similar opinion, stating that strikes based on affiliation were
iipermissible, but that it was "proper to strike [a juror] on the basis of a belief that would prevent
him from basing his decision on the evidence and instructions, even if the belief had a religious
backing." United States v. Stafford, 136 F.3d 1109, 1114 (7th Cr. 1998).
73. 347 F.3d 500 (3d Cr. 2003).
74. Dejsm, 347 F.3d at 509-11.
75. Id at 502.
76. Id
77. 352 F.3d 654 (2d Cr. 2003).
78. Bnioa 352 F.3d at 668.
79. Id
80. Id at 669-70, 670 n.19.
81. Id at 670.
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It may become apparent during voir dire that a potential juror's religious
views maymake it more likelythan not that the potential juror will vote for death
under any circumstances after a finding of guilt. In such a case, the potential
juror can be excused for cause. In Gnn u nea= 1th, 2 a potential juror
revealed upon questioning from the court that he "only believed in the Bible, an
eye for an eye, tooth for a tooth."83 The Gnm court found that the trial court
erred in seating this potential juror. 4 Clearly, the potential juror was a candidate
for being excused for cause based on his inabilityto consider a punishment less
than death if capital murder were proven beyond a reasonable doubt."5 Further,
under the prevailing law of various circuits, the peremptory strike of a juror with
such religious views could be defended from a Batson attack under Dazis- the
juror demonstrated a willingness to impose the ultimate punishment based on
his fervent religious views. 6 Also, stating that he believes only what he has read
in the Bible qualifies as a strongly held belief, rather than a particular religious
affiliation, which fits within the more limited religious peremptory strike model
of DeJem, but perhaps not within the "activities" strike model of Browm.
Defense counsel should take the opportunity to strike overtly religious
venirepersons with support from Daus, Dejem, and Bromi or dismiss potential
jurors for cause based on G-nm
2. GaaigA rwnt
Religiously grounded closing arguments by prosecutors are generally
challenged as a violation of a defendant's due process rights under the Fifth and
Fourteenth amendments."8 However, rarelydo courts find that the prosecutor's
82. 546 S.E2d 446 (Va. 2001).
83. Green v. Commonwealth, 546 S.E.2d 446,448,451 (Va. 2001) (finding that the trialcourt
committed manifest error by seating challenged jurors who showed evidence of bias).
84. Id at451.
85. Se Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 521 (1968) ([A] State may not entrust the
determination of whether a man should live or die to a tribunal organized to return a verdict of
death."). The W'dxpom Court indicated that the State could exclude potential jurors who "made
unmistakablyclear ... that theywould aaiadmMyvote against the imposition of capitalpunishment
without regard to any evidence that might be developed at the trial of the case before them."
W'idspoo?, 391 U.S. at 522 n21. In Wainwright v. Wit, 469 US. 412 (1985), the Court extended
W'dznpooto defense challenges of potential jurors predisposed to vote for death. Waidx;469
US. at 423-24.
86. See Dav, 504 N.W2d at 771 (refusing to extend Batson to peremptory strikes based on
a venireperson's religion).
87. S, DerJisz, 347 F3d at 509-10 (finding that a peremptory challenge based on a
venireperson's heightened religious activity was constitutionaD; Bmr, 352 F.3d at 668 (stating that
striking a juror because of religious activities does not violate Bats).
88. See GaryJ. Simson & Stephen P. Garvey, Kr&n" On Hewe's Door Rahih4g the Rleq'Rd4igin inDe adC Pay Ges, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 1090, 1111 (2001) (noting that objections at
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comments rise to the level of a due process violation." The Supreme Court has
held that the comments must have "so infected the trial with unfairness as to
make the resulting conviction a denial of due process."9
At least one court has held that religious arguments byprosecutors to justify
the sentence of death violated the Eighth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.91 In Sardoud u Calder', 92 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit held that "the prosecution's invocation of [religious] higherlaw
... violates the Eighth Amendment principle that the death penalty may be
constitutionally imposed only when the jury makes findings under a sentencing
scheme that carefully focuses the jury on the specific factors it is to consider in
reaching a verdict."93 The Sardoud court found that the prosecutor's arguments
during closing "did not recognize such a refined approach."94 The prosecutor
in Sardoud warned:
[Defense counsel] says don't play God. Let everyperson be in subjec-
tion to the governing authorities for there is no authoriyexcept fromGod and t ose whch are established by God. Therefore, he who
resists authority has opposed the ordinance of 
God, and they ho
have opposed fill receive condemnations upon themselves for rulers
are not a cause of fear for good behavior, but for evil. Do you want
to have no fear of authonty. Do what is good and you w have
praise for the same for it is a minister of God to you for good. But if
you do what is evil, be afraid for it does not bear the sword for noth-
trial or on appeal to such religious closing arguments are usually brought under the Due Process
Clause or similar state provision).
89. Id; see, eg, Boyd v. French, 147 F.3d 319, 328-29 (4th Cir. 1998) (finding that the
prosecution's use of biblical quotations in dosing argument did not result in an unfair trial).
90. Donnelly v. DeCristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974); sw Bennett v. Angelone, 92 F.3d
1336, 1346 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing Dann!y in holding that the prosecutor's use of biblical passages
in closing argument to justify imposition of the death penalty did not rise to the level of a due
process violation).
91. Sie U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (prohibiting the infliction of "cruel and unusual punish-
ment"); Sandoval v. Calderon, 241 F.3d 765,776 (9th Cr. 2001) (finding that biblical references in
closing argument by the prosecutor violated Eighth Amendment).
92. 241 F.3d 765 (9th Cir. 2001).
93. Sandom 241 F.3d at 776 (citing Godfreyv. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980)).
94. Id; seeJones v. Kemp, 706 F. Supp. 1534, 1559-60 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (stating that "[t]he
jury which sentenced the petitioner had a duyto applythe law of the State of Georgia as given by
the trial judge, not its own interpretation of the law or its own interpretation of precepts of the
Bible, in determining whether the petitioner should live or die"); q Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137,
180-81 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting (noting the "crude proportionalityof 'an eye for an eye' ");
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,620 (1977) (Burger, CJ., dissenting) ("As a matter of constitutional
principle, [the Eighth Amendment proportionality] test cannot have the primitive simplicity of 'life
for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth.' ").
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i for it is a minister of God an avenger who brings wrath upon one
wo practices evil.95
This prosecutor clearly advocated for the jury to abandon consideration of the
evidence and instructions of the court and instead indicated that it is ordained
by God to return a verdict of death. The court found that "[tihe obvious danger
of such a suggestion is that the jury will give less weight to, or perhaps even
disregard, the legal instructions given it bythe trial judge in favor of the asserted
higher law."96
To support its Eighth Amendment ruling, the Ninth Circuit cited Gafy
v Geo* 97 which held that "if a State wishes to authorize capital punishment it
has a constitutional responsibility to tailor and apply its law in a manner that
avoids the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death penalty."" The
Sardoudcourt found that the prosecutor's inclusion of a religious justification for
the infliction of the death penalty was prohibited by the Eighth Amendment
because it moved the juryto consider factors beyond those offered into evidence
and governed by the applicable law.99 Further, the court found that an
"[a]rgument involving religious authority also undercuts the jury's own sense of
responsibility for imposing the death penalty.""1 ' The court noted that the
Supreme Court has disapproved of arguments that indicate to the jury that its
responsibility is lessened due to evental review by a higher court.101 The
Sarnoalcourt ruled that the same logic applies to arguments transferring respon-
sibilityto a higher religious authority.'° The court concluded by affirming the
district court's grant of a writ of habeas corpus to Sandoval based on the im-
proper religious argument of the prosecutor.0 3
Defense counsel must be readyto object to religion-based arguments made
bythe prosecution during closing arguments. The trial judge should recognize
95. Sarnimo, 241 F.3d at 775 n.1.
96. Id at 776.
97. 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
98. Gafr.) 446 U.S. at 428.
99. Sandow 241 F.3d at 776.
100. Id at 777.
101. Id; seeCaldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320,328-29 (1985) (holding that it is unconstitu-
tional for a death sentence to be imposed in cases in which the sentencer "has been led to believe
that responsibility for determining appropriateness of defendant's death rests elsewhere").
102. Sankdo 241 F.3d at 777. The court noted that religion-based arguments have been
condemned by nearly all federal and state courts that have ruled on the subject. Id (citing Coe v.
Bell, 161 F.3d 320, 351 (6th Cr. 1998); Bennett v. Angelone, 92 F.3d 1336, 1346 (4th Cir. 1996);
Cunningham v. Zant, 928 F.2d 1006,1019-20 (1 1th Cr. 1991); United States v. Giry, 818 F.2d 120,
133 (1st ar. 1987); Commonwealth v. Chambers, 599 A.2d 630, 644 (Pa. 1991); People v. Eckles,
404 N.E.2d 358, 365 g1l. 1980); State v. Wangberg, 136 N.W.2d 853, 854-55 (Minn. 1965)).
103. Sarxow4 241 F.3d at 780.
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such arguments as a violation of the defendant's constitutional rights under the
Eighth and/or Fifth Amendment. If the objection is not sustained, the issue is
not procedurally defaulted and it is preserved for appeal.
3. Jwykmtrs
A capital defense attomeycan help mitigate the effect that a jury's religiosity
will have on a potential determination of guilt or sentence with an appropriate
jury instruction admonishing the jury to limit its deliberations to the evidence
and facts presented at trial. In Virginia, there is no specific model jury instruc-
tion addressing the issue of extraneous material."° The lack of a model instruc-
tion leaves it in the hands of defense counsel to provide an instruction to the
court that admonishes the jury not to use or discuss religious justifications for
the death penalty. For example, in Keil u CMUi 1 ",0 the Supreme Court of
Virginia noted the trial court's instruction to the juryto refrain from reading any
newspaper accounts of the trial while deliberating.")' Protecting the verdict from
the influence of the pro-death rhetoric of religious texts is an ongoing pursuit
throughout trial. Defense counsel should always make a request for an instruc-
tion informing the jury of its duty to consider only the law and evidence of the
case before it.
B. Trad Direct A ta&ks on Reli gicBasd Deah Sen ,en
The jury does not always follow the admonitions of the court and can still
deliberate or deliver a verdict based on religious doctrine. In such cases, defense
counsel must attackthe religion-based deliberations or verdict directlyon appeal.
Two provisions of the United States Constitution have proved only marginally
effective in challenging the jury's use of extraneous material the Sixth Amend-
ment guarantee of an impartial jury, and the Eighth Amendment prohibition
104. The only model jury instruction that comes close to addressing the issue is Instruction
No. 2.700, which addresses the jury's duty in "Fixing Punishment." VA. MODELJuRY IhTRUG
MIONS, CuM., 2.700 (2003).
105. 278 S.E.2d 826 (Va. 1981).
106. Keil v. Commonwealth, 278 S.E.2d 826, 831 (Va. 1981). The court inKed recounted the
trial court's instruction to the jury in a footnote:
Now, I would admonish you you're not to discuss this matter with anyone, nor allow
anyone to discuss it with you, nor will you discuss it among yourselves unless and until
you're all together and present in the juryroom.... Now, I'm going to instruct you
again not to read any account in the newspapers of any of thi proceedings in ihis
Cort. There are thifigs that are discussed out of the hearing of hejur hich the
newspaper may or may not report, but, in any event, it is not to be considered by you
as evidence. I told you many times that you can consider only evidence that you liear
in this Courtroom. And byte same token, I don't want you reading anyof the articles
which you may see and can tell from the headlines it involves this case.
Ke, 278 S.E.2d at 831 n.*.
[Vol. 16:2
KEEPING RELIGIOUS MATERIAL OUT
against cruel and unusual punishment. 7 In the discussion that follows, it should
be remembered that the Virginia requirements of (1) actual misconduct and (2)
probable prejudice are similar to other states and the federal system.'0 8
1. Sixth A tvr&n Ri& to an IqrtialwJsy
The traditional challenge to juror misconduct is made under the Sixth
Amendment right to an impartial jury or similar state provision."'° The United
States Supreme Court in Renrir v UniaStats' held that "[i]n a criminal case,
any private communication, contact, or tampering, directly or indirectly, with a
juror during a trial about the matter pending before the jury is, for obvious
reasons, deemed presumptivelyprejudicial."" The Court found that a Federal
Bureau of Investigation inquiry revealed that a member of the jury had been
inappropriately contacted by an outside party offering a bribe for a favorable
verdict." 2 The Court, however, qualified this conclusion and stated that "[t]he
presumption is not conclusive, but the burden rests heavily upon the Govern-
ment to establish, after notice to and hearing of the defendant, that such contact
with the juror was harmless to the defendant.""' Limiting the potential remedy
offered bythe Rer Court's reasoning, the Court in Snit v PhilOts'1 held that
due process did not require a new trial "every time a juror has been placed in a
potentiallycompromising situation.""' The PhiOp Court used a harmless-error
analysis in deciding that a juror's application for employment to the district
107. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (providng in pertinent that "[iln all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury... [and] to be
confronted with the witnesses against him"); U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (providing that "cruel and
unusual punishments [shall not be] inflicted").
108. Se, eg, United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 738 (1993) (finding that the Court
"generallyha[s] analyzed outside intrusions upn the juryfor prejudicial impact"); Smith v. Phillips,
455 US. 209, 217 (1982) (illustrating that "due process does not require a new trial every time a
juror has been placed in a potentiallycompromisng situation"); People v. Danks, 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d.
767, 795 (Cal. 2004) (finding that when investigating potential juror misconduct, "(i[f we conclude
there was misconduct, we then consider whether the misconduct was prejudicial"); Wiser v. People,
732 P.2d 1139, 1143 (Co. 1987) (en banc) (holding that a defendant's conviction must be reversed
"where there is a reasonable possibility that the verdict was tainted by the introduction of outside
information or influences into the jury deliberations").
109. See U.S. CO ST. armend. VI (providing in pertinent part that "[in all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoythe right to a speedy and public trial, byan impartial jury... [and] to
be confronted with the witnesses against him").
110. 347 US. 227 (1954).
111. Remrner v. United States, 347 U.S. 227,229 (1954).
112. Id at 228.
113. Id at 229 (citing Mamza, 146 U.S. at 148-50).
114. 455 U.S. 209 (1982).
115. Smith v. Phillips, 455 US. 209, 217 (1982).
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attorney's office during the trial did not prejudice the defendant and that a post-
trial hearing on the matter satisfied the requirements of due process. 16 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has held that the Phi//is
holding switched the burden of proof from the prosecution to the defendant,
and other courts have found that the Rerer presumption of prejudice applies
onlyto a limited set of circumstances. '17
In interpreting the bounds of the Sixth Amendment guarantee in matters
of extraneous material, the court in Jone u Keno" was confronted with a jury
that had been allowed to consult the Bible during deliberations." 9 The court first
remarked how the Bible could be subject to varied interpretation and how it
conflicted with the Georgia statutory scheme by disallowing the consideration
of mercy as a sentencing factor. 2 ' In analyzing the contours of the Sixth
Amendment guarantee of a fair trial, the Jones court cited the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit:
The Sixth Amendment guarantees that the accused shall enjoy the
right to a trial by an impartial jury and shall be confronted with the
witnesses and evidence against him.... The most general interpreta-
tion of a fair trial is that it be conducted before unprejudiced jurors
under the superintendence of a judge who instructs them as to the law
and advises them as to the facts. Judicial control of the juror's knowl-
116. Id at 215-16 ("This Court has long held that the remedyfor allegations of juror partiality
is a hearing in which the defendant has the opportunity to prove actual bias.").
117. SeUnited States v. Walker, 1 F.3d 423,431 (6thCir. 1993) (finding that Phi//dz switched
the burden of proof from the prosecution to the defense (citing Phi//o, 455 U.S. at 215-16 )); see,
eg, United States v. Kelley, 140 F.3d 596,608 (5th Cr. 1998) (concluding that the Retiwrpresump-
tion applies only when extrinsic matter has actually influenced the jury); United States v. Blumeyer,
62 F.3d 1013, 1016-18 (8th Cir. 1995) (ruling that the Ramzr presumption applies only when
outside material relates to factual issues of the case); United States v. Boylan, 898 F.2d 230,261 (1st
Cir. 1990) (concluding that the Romrr 'presumption is applicable only where there is an egregious
tampering or third party communication which directly injects itself into the jury process").
118. 706 F. Supp. 1534 (N.D. Ga. 1989).
119. Se Jones v. Kemp, 706 F. Supp. 1534, 1560 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (finding reversible error
when the trial court allowed the jury to consult the Bible during capital sentencing deliberations).
120. Id The Jew court remarked as follows:
Georia's death penalty statute lays out specific guidelines for separating "the many"
from the few." The Bible, however, in some places, licitly rejects te dawng. of
distinctions in murder cases: "Whoso sheddeth man's blood, b man shall his blood
be shed: for in the image of God made he man." [G sie 9:6]. Whereas the Bible
commands that "thine eye shall not pi but life shall for life, eye for eye tooth for
tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot," [D .,mY 1 2 1], it is ti law i tiis Circuitthat .aguments which disparae mercyas a valid sentencing consideration "strike at the
most important component 0 a capital jury's discretion favoring capital defendants."
Id at 1559-60; se GA. CODE ANN. S 17-10-30(b) (2003) (listing the crimes for which the death
penaltyis an applicable punishment)i Ckr% 446 US. at 427 ("capital sentencing scheme must,
in short provide a meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which the penalty] is
imposed from the many cases in which it is not. (inteinal citations omitted)).
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edge of the case pursuant to the laws of evidence is fundamental to
the prevention of bias and prejudice.1
The Jc*s court used the Fifth Circuit standard as its guide.1 22
TheJnw court found that the use of the Bible could carrysuch weight with
a layman juror that "the effect maybe highlyprejudicialto the defendant, and the
confidence in the reliability of the jury's decision which must guide imposition
of the death penalty may be undermined." 2 1 The court likened the use of the
Bible during deliberations to the prohibition against the use of a dictionary or
legal texts.' The court found that "[i]t is well settled that religion maynot play
a role in the sentencing process" and that the Bible has the potential to influence
the juryin a waythat far exceeds that of dictionaries and other legal texts. 2 ' The
court concluded that the use of a Bible bythe juryviolated the Sixth Amendment
guarantee to a fair and impartial jury 26 The court recognized that the parties did
not raise an Establishment Clause claim and it refused to address those implica-
tions.'27 By mentioning that the parties did not raise the issue of the Establish-
ment Clause, the court implied that the clause might be a bar to the presence of
a Bible in the jury room.




124. Id at 1558.
125. Id at 1559 ("To the average juror, Webster's Dictionarymaybe no more than a reference
book, and The Reader's Digest nothing more than a diverting periodical; but the Bible is an
authoritative religious document and is different not just in degree, although this difference is
pronounced, but in kind."). TbeJr court cited numerous cases for the proposition that religion
maynot playa role inthe sentencing process. Se Giry, 818 F.2d at 133 ("The prosecutor's reference
to [the defendant's] denial of Christ constituted an irrelevant and inflammatory appeal to the jurors'
private, religious beliefs."). The Supreme Court of Tennessee has held that a juryforeman's reading
of Biblical passages to the juryduring deliberations in the penaltyphase of a capital case was error
that required new sentencing. SeeTennessee v. Harrington, 627 S.W.2d 345,350 (Tenn. 1981), wt
das 457 U.S. 1110 (1982).
126. Jo , 706 F. Supp. at 1560 ("A situation in which a jury, unsupervised by the court and
unobserved by counsel, could reach a conclusion by consulting sources other than the legal charge
of the court and evidence actually received by the court is not permitted.").
127. Id (There is thus no issue raised here involving the ... Establishment clause, such as
is involved in the school prayer cases.").
128. SeeU.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of




2. Ei)th A nvm PM ibitiiA gznt Cnud ard Unusual Puwishnri
The Eighth Amendment can serve as another ground for challenging a
religion-based verdict. InJotz, the petitioner raised his claim not only on Sixth
Amendment grounds, but also under the Eighth Amendment and claimed that
a verdict based partially on the Bible was arbitrary and capricious and therefore
violated the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.'29 TheJone court
quoted Gcafy, in which the Supreme Court stated:
[I]f a State wishes to authorize capital punishment, it has a constitu-
tional responsibiityto tailor and applyits law in a manner that avoids
the arbirary and capnicious inflic thon of te death penalty .... Itmust channel the sentencer's discretion by "clear and objective stan-
d.ards" that provide "specific and detailed guidance," and that makerautonally revewable the process for ia posmg a sentence of death. 30
Thus, "a capital sentencing scheme must..,. provide a 'meaningful basis for
distinguishing the few cases in which [the penalty] is imposed from the manyin
which i is not.' "3 Under this reasoning, a verdict based on religious material
is not only unfair under th h Amendment, but is arbitrary and capricious
under the Eighth Amendment. The Jorm court concluded that the trial court
committed constitutional error under both the Sixth and Eighth Amendments
in allowing the use of the Bible. 32
V. A r is Ut4er e Establshnrn Clause f a FistA nrtnce '
The Establishment claue of the First Amendment raises another barrier
to the inclusion of religious texts in jury deliberations.m The United States
Supreme Court has stated "that the effect of the religious freedom Amendment
to our Constiutio wast take every form of propagation of religion out of the
realm of things which could directly or indirecty be made public business and
therebybe supported in whole or in part at taxpayers' expense." 34 Further, "[i]t
was to create a complete and permanent separation of the spheres of religious
activity and civil authority by comprehensively forbidding every form of public
aid or support for religion." 35 The Establishment Clause has been the basis for
129. r 706 F. Spp. at 1558; se U.S. ONST. amend. VIII (providing that "cruel and
unusual punishments sh not be] inflicted").
130. Gso r 446 U.S. at 428 (citations omitted).
131. at 427 (alteration in origina (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting G s 428
U.S. at 188).
132. Jns, 706 F. Supp. at 1560.
133. Se U.S. COMsT. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion .... ").
134. Sch. Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 216 (1963).
135. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
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prohibiting prayer and the reading of Bibles in public schools, as well as limiting
the delegation of public authority to a religious organization." 6 Further, the
Establishment Clause is incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment and is
applicable to state and local government.' The same principles should forbid
the jury from consulting and relying on the Bible to impose a sentence of death.
An Establishment Clause claim raised by a defendant, however, is not
certain to succeed. Professors GaryJ. Simson and Stephen P. Garvey have
noted that a more difficult question arises when determining whether a defen-
dant can challenge the use of religious texts during deliberations on Establish-
ment Clause grounds than when a challenge is raised bya member of the jury.'
They state, in the case of group prayer conducted by the jury, that due to the
"veryconfining nature of the juryroom during deliberations, the objecting juror
experiences significant emotional, psychological, and constitutional harm bythe
forced exposure to the group prayer and bythe express or tacit pressure to join
in the prayer."139 Although speaking in the context of student-led prayer, Justice
Stevens could have been talking about religious texts in the jury room when he
stated that "[s]uch a system encourages divisiveness along religious lines and
threatens the imposition of coercion upon those students not desiring to partici-
pate in a religious exercise."' 40 Of course, a capital defendant does not suffer an
immediate and direct impact from the use of religious texts during deliberations,
136. Sa eg, Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 310-16 (2000) (invalidating
student-led prayer at high school football games on Establishment Clause grounds); Bd. of Educ.
of Kiryas Joel Vill Sch. Dist. v. Gruet, 512 U.S. 687, 709-10 (1994) (finding that the creation of
a separate school district for a religious group in order for it to regulate the schools according to
its faith was prohibited by the Establishment Clause); Sd ,p, 374 U.S. at 223 (holding that a
beginning-of-the-dayBible reading and recitation of the Lord's Prayer in unison were violations of
the Establishment Clause); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962) (finding the recitation of the
"Regent's Prayer" by schoolchildren to be a violation of the Establishment Clause).
137. See U.S. COroT. amend. XIV, S1 (stating in pertinent part that "[n]o State shall... deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws"); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S.
38, 49 (1985) (l[Wihen the Constitution was amended to prohibit any State from depriving any
person of liberty without due process of law, that Amendment imposed the same substantive
l tions on the States' power to legislate that the First Amendment had always imposed on the
Congressis] power."); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (applying the First
Amendment to an analysis of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
138. Simson & Garvey, s"qm note 88, at 1126. An analogy could be drawn between the
vindication of the Free Exercise Clause rights of a juror by a defendant and a challenge under
Barrm, in which the Fourteenth Amendment rights of a juror are vindicated by a defendant. Se
B asor, 476 U.S. at 89 (holding that it is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to strike a potential juror based on race). However, this possibility will not be
discussed in this article.
139. Simson & Garvey, su"r note 88, at 1126.
140. Sata FeIrdep. Sd Dist, 530 U.S. at 317.
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but the impact is presumably absorbed through a higher likelihood of a sentence
of death.
When raising an Establishment Clause claim, the court must first find that
the capital sentencing juryis a state actor."' Next, the defendant must determine
which claim or claims to raise in order to challenge success fullythe jury's verdict.
Professors Simson and Garvey suggest two claims for a defendant to advance
when attacking an adverse verdict reached by use of the Bible or other religious
text: (1) the verdict was religion-based in violation of the United States Supreme
Court's test from Lenmv Kaojn; 1 42 or (2) the use of the religious text created
a religiously charged atmosphere in violation of the Court's reformulated "en-
dorsement" test.'43 A third possible claim is that the use of religious texts
violates the First Amendment because "the Constitution guarantees that govern-
ment may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise,
or otherwise act in a waywhich 'establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or
tends to do so.' "'"" Such a claim avoids the application of the Lemmtest, and
substitutes in its place a prima facie violation standard.14 Finally, under the
harmless-error doctrine espoused in Chapnun vu Qaoirra,46 the Government
must show beyond a reasonable doubt that the use of religious texts by the jury
did not prejudice the outcome. 4 '
141. SeeU.S. CONST. amend. I (prohibiting Congress from creating laws designed to inhibit
or endorse religion). The United States Supreme Court has noted that "[t]he Fourteenth Amend-
ment i oses (the] limitations (of the First Amendment] on the legislative power of the States and
their political subdivisions." Santa Fe Irkep. S&k Dist, 530 U.S. at 301 (citing J]#r, 472 U.S. at
49-50.
142. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
143. Simson & Garvey, s"pra note 88, at 1127-28; see Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,
612-13 (1971) (finding an Establishment Clause violation unless the government action had a
secular purpose, a principal or primary effect that did not inhibit or advance religion, and did not
result in excessive government entanglement with religion); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,
691-92 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (reformulating the L arwn test to find an Establishment
Clause violation in cases in which "the government intends to convey a message of endorsement
or disapproval of religion," or "the government practice [has] the effect of communicating a
message of government endorsement or disapproval of religion").
144. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (quoting Lynhb, 465 U.S. at 678).
145. See id (refusing to apply Leonw in cases in which "[t]he government involvement with
religious activity ... is pervasive, to the point of creating a state-sponsored and state-directed
religious exercise in a public school").
146. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
147. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) ("[We hold... that before a federal
constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.").
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A. TheJwy as Goemnrn Actor
The first hurdle to finding an Establishment Clause violation is to deter-
mine whether the violation is committed by a state actor within the meaning of
the First Amendment.'48 When a citizen acquiesces to serve as a juror, he sheds
his role as a citizen and accepts the role of a state actor.'49 Indeed, the Supreme
Court has declared that "the objective of jury selection proceedings is to deter-
mine representation on a gmevntal bdy."' The Court also noted that "[t]he
jury exercises the power of the court and of the government that confers the
court's jurisdiction."' 5' As "a governmental body," all of the legal restrictions
and privileges of being a state actor are similarly accepted. Jurors are protected
by common law immunity from prosecution, just as judges and prosecutors are,
and should be held to the same standard."5 2 Further, because theyreceive payfor
their service, jurors are paid employees of the state." 3 It is onlya natural exten-
sion of current law governing the actions of court actors to find the jury to be
similarly bound.
Ancillary to a claim that a jury verdict based on Biblical teachings is a
violation of the Establishment Clause is a claim bythe jurors themselves that any
attempt to remove the Bible from deliberations is a violation of their Free
Exercise Clause protections. "  This argument is fruitless, however, under
established Virginia law. In Rim u Ctmwath,' the Supreme Court of
Virginia held that protection of a citizen's right to freedom of religion does not
provide them with immunity from complying with reasonable requirements
148. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ( Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion ...
149. Simson & Garvey, supra note 88, at 1108 ("Although the members of the jury are private
citizens for purposes other than their jury service, they should be seen as state actors when serving
as jurors because they are acting pursuant to a delegation of authority from the state.").
150. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 626 (1991) (emphasis added).
151. Idat624.
152. SeAndrews v. Ring, 585 S.E.2d 780,785 (Va. 2003) (noting that prosecutorialimmunity
is a matter of state common law and finding that a prosecutor is immune from prosecution when
his actions are "intimately connected with the prosecutor's role in judicial proceedings"); sw also
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 418 n.12 (1976) ("Few doctrines were more solidlyestablished
at common law than the immunity of judges from liability for damages for acts committed within
their judicial jurisdiction."); Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396, 403 (2d Cir. 1926), a4 275 U.S. 503
(1927) ("[A] petit juror is not liable for anystatements made byhim during the deliberations of the
jury after it has retired to consider a verdict, and that his privilege in this respect is not limited to
the words which are shown to be pertinent to the questions arising for decision.").
153. Simson & Garvey, supra note 88, at 1108.
154. Se U.S. CONST. amend. I ('Congress shall make no law... prohibiting the free exercise
(of religion].").
155. 49 S.E.2d 342 (Va. 1948).
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imposed bythe State.156 When applied to the jury context, Rke prevents a juror
from claiming a free exercise right to convict a defendant on religious grounds.
157
Because juryservice is quite obviouslya "reasonable civil requirement[] imposed
by [the] State" that comes with explicit rules of conduct, a juror is obligated to
set aside textual teachings and specific religious arguments when deliberating
during sentencing."5 8
It is also equally clear that a jury room is not a traditional public forum that
entitles the jurors to discuss freely and openly any religious or political justifica-
tions for imposing the death penalty. 9 The Court has found that "[ilt is undeni-
able.., that speech which is constitutionally protected against state suppression
is not thereby accorded a guaranteed forum on all property owned by the
State."16 Moreover, the Court found that "[tihe right to use government
propertyfor one's private expression depends upon whether the propertyhas by
law or tradition been given the status of a public forum, or rather has been
reserved for specific official uses."' 61 The jury room is not one of those tradi-
tional public forums where freedom of speech is paramount; rather it is a forum
"reserved for specific official uses."162 Therefore, a juror's Free Exercise Clause
rights must yield to the command of the Establishment Clause.
B. Appvig the Lemon Test
As a state actor, a jury cannot impose the death penalty based on religious
grounds without violating the Establishment Clause. Whether the Establishment
Clause has in fact been violated has traditionallybeen determined byapplying the
156. Rice v. Commonwealth, 49 S.E.2d 342, 347 (Va. 1948) ("The constitutional protection
of religious freedom, while it insures religious equality, on the other hand does not provide
immunity from compliance with reasonable civil requirements imposed by the State.". The
relevant Virginia constitutional provision states:
No man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious wors.hip, place, or
ministry whatsoever nor shall be ezforced, restrained molested, or burdiened in his
bodyor goods, nor sall otherwise suffer on account o? his religious opinions or belief;
but All men shall be free to profess and by argument to maintain thir opinions in
matters of religion, and the same shall in nowise diminish, enlarge, or affect their civil
capacities.
VA. CONST. art. I, S 16.
157. SeeR, 49 S.E.2d at 347 (finding that religion does not provide any person immunity
from complying "with reasonable civil requirements imposed by the State").
158. Id
159. Sw Capitol Square Review & AdvisoryBd. v. Pinette, 515 US. 753, 761 (1995) (finding
"that speech which is constitutionally protected against state suppression is not thereby accorded
a guaranteed forum on all property owned by the State").
160. Id
161. Id
162. See id (outlining the test for determining a public forum).
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test established in Le'-rn. 63 For jury deliberations based on religious text to be
found unconstitutional, it must be shown that the use of the religious text during
deliberations had: (1) no secular purpose; (2) no principal or primary effect to
promote or inhibit religion; or (3) not represented an excessive entanglement of
government and religion. 64 The use of the Bible in jury deliberations fails all
three prongs of the L emm test.
As for the first of Lemts requirements, there can be no serious argument
made that the inclusion of religious texts in jury deliberations has a secular
"purpose." Religious texts by their nature are sacred and sectarian. A juror
would only make reference to a religious text during deliberations to inject an
improper spiritual element into the deliberations. The United States Supreme
Court has ruled that the stated purpose of the government action need not be
completelyfree from religious effect, but must be free from sectarian purpose.1 65
The act of using a religious book to guide decision-making during jury delibera-
tions cannot have a secular purpose.
A strong case could also be made challenging tainted verdicts under the
"effect" prong of the Lernm test. Under this prong of the test, a government
action violates anti-establishment principles if it has the principal or primary
effect of promoting or inhibiting religion. 166 Allowing jurors to rely on religious
passages in order to reach a verdict has the primary effect of turning a verdict
based on both law and evidence into a religious edict calling for the execution of
the convicted defendant. The Supreme Court has "noted that the prohibition
against governmental endorsement of religion 'preclude[s] government from
conveying or attempting to convey a message that religion or a particular reli-
gious belief isfazord or p na ' "16 Allowing a jury verdict wherein the Bible
was used as a justification for the death sentence is an impermissible grant of
approval to the particular religious beliefs. As such, it must be found to have the
primary or principal effect of furthering those religious beliefs.
The threat of government entanglement with religion is also high if reli-
giouslytainted verdicts are allowed to stand. The United States Supreme Court
stated that" t]he Constitution decrees that religion must be a private matter for
the individual, the family, and the institutions of private choice, and that while
some involvement and entanglement are inevitable, lines must be drawn.' "168
163. SLevr, 403 U.S. at 612-13 (restating tests for determining a violation of the Establish-
ment Clause).
164. Id
165. Id at 612.
166. Id (holding that a government action is valid if "its principal or primary effect [is] one
that neither advances nor inhibits religion").
167. County of Alleghenyv. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 593 (1989) (emphasis in original) (quoting
J,&f 472 U.S. at 70 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
168. Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116,126 (1982) (quoting Lanx 403 U.S. at 625).
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The danger to avoid is" 'a fusion of governmental and religious functions.' "169
Imposing the death penalty for religious reasons is "a fusion of governmental
and religious functions" that violates the Establishment Clause. The United
States Supreme Court has stated that a "mere appearance of a joint exercise of
legislative authority by Church and State provides a significant symbolic benefit
to religion in the minds of some byreason of the power conferred."70 The same
principle should apply to a mixing of judicial and religious authority because
nothing can provide a larger "symbolic benefit to religion" than the appearance
that the criminal justice system is governed by religion.
Government can no sooner allow Bible-based verdicts than it can Koran-
based verdicts. Indeed, the numerous cases cited throughout this article, which
exclusively deal with improper uses of the Bible, indicate that it is a confluence
of Christianity and government functions that influence verdicts in American
courts.' The juryand the Bible are alreadyentangled. What is needed is for the
Bible to be disentangled from the American justice system.
C Gomwn nt EdoserntrfRdzgxn
In recent years, the United States Supreme Court's Establishment Clause
jurisprudence has been in a state of flux. 7 ' Largely, the conflict has been based
on the continued vitality of Lenun and the purpose of the Establishment Clause
itself.17 One reformulation of the "purpose" and "effect" prongs of the Lenzt
test currently employed by the Court has been the creation of what has been
termed the "endorsement" test. Formulated by Justice O'Connor in LyrAn v
Dwwvly,"' the endorsement test inquiry seeks to determine whether. (1) "the
government intends to convey a message of endorsement or disapproval of
religion"; or (2) "the government practice [has] the effect of communicating a
message of government endorsement or disapproval of religion." 7' "An affir-
mative answer to either question... render[s] the challenged practice unconstitu-
tional."7 6 Four of the Justices currently sitting on the United States Supreme
169. Id (quoting Sdxnpp, 374 U.S. at 222).
170. Id at 125-26.
171. Seesra Part IV (discussing cases involving the improper use of religion during various
stages of trial).
172. SeeSimson & Garvey, supra note 88, at 1102 (stating that "the Establishment Clause has
been a source of considerable doctrinal turmoil in recent years").
173. Se Lee, 505 U.S. at 644 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing disapproval of the Lmmi test by
several justices). As the Court indicated in Leni, much of the confusion is because it "can only
dimly perceive the lines of demarcation in this extraordinarily sensitive area of constitutional law."
Lenin 403 U.S. at 612.
174. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
175. Lynchv. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,691-92 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (re-interpret-
ing L emon and finding that a nativity scene did not violate the Establishment Clause).
176. Id
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Court disagree with the current state of affairs. 7 Rather than followLermn and
its progeny, the dissenting four Justices would find the Establishment Clause
offended only upon a showing of coercion by the questioned state practice.17
The effect of a religion-based verdict, especially one grounded in the "eye
for eye" rhetoric of the Old Testament, is to eliminate the discretion that the jury
has to impose life rather than death. As explained by the courts in Jor and
Sardowd, a reliance on the Bible could eliminate the possibility of mercy and
could lead to the jurylaying down its burden as the finder of fact and passing the
burden on to a higher biblical authority.'79 This passing of the burden is an
endorsement of religion just as surely as is the creation of a school district for
the benefit of a particular religious sect." 0 In Bard Cf Education of Kir)ys Joel
Viage Sdxd Distrnkt v Gnaw-t ' the United States Supreme Court found that
" 'the Free Exercise and the Establishment Clause compels the State to pursue
a course of neutrality toward religion,' favoring neither one religion over others
nor religious adherents collectively over nonadherents.""' More simply, "civil
power must be exercised in a manner neutral to religion."' The Court invali-
dated a New York statute that granted authority over a newly created school
district to the religious sect which comprised the residents of the district.'84 The
Court found that "there is 'ample room under the Establishment Clause for
benevolent neutralitythat will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsor-
ship and without interference.' "88
177. See Le, 505 U.S. at 640-44 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating dissenting opinion that was
joined byCliefJustice Rehnquist and Associate Justices White and Thomas); Caa 0fA ffe&y 492
U.S. at 659-63 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (stating a
concurring and dissenting opinion that was joined byClief Justice Rehnquist and Associate Justices
White and Scalia). Simson and Garveystate that Justice Kennedyrnay be more comfortable with
the endorsement test, as indicated by his later agreement with the majority in Sanva FeI nd~odar
SddDistrct v Doe. Simson & Garvey, supra note 88, at 1102 n.67; s&Santa Felrn4. Sd. Dist, 530
U.S. at 317 (invalidating student-led prayer at high school football games on Establishment Clause
grounds).
178. SeeLie, 505 U.S. at 641-42 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[Tihere is simply no support for the
proposition that the officiallysponsored nondenominational invocation and benediction... - with
no one legally coerced to recite them- violated the Constitution of the United States.")
179. Jors, 706 F. Supp. at 1558; Saniowd, 241 F.3d at 776.
180. See Bd fE dwu f KiryasJod VilL S&t Dist, 512 US. at 705 (finding that the State of New
York impermissibly delegated governmental authorityto a religious sect in violation of the Estab-
lishment Clause).
181. 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
182. Bd fEdu qfKiys Jod Viii Sd,. Dist, 512 U.S. at 696 (quoting Comm. for Pub. Educ.
v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 792-93 (1973)).
183. Id at 704 (citing Larki:4 459 U.S. at 120-21).
184. Idat710.
185. Id at 705 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Corp. of Presiding Bishop of
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334 (1987)).
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To allow the juryto predicate the infliction of the most severe and irrevoca-
ble punishment our justice system provides on Biblical verse is a violation of the
principle of neutrality reiterated time and again by the United States Supreme
Court.'6 The delegation of sentencing authority to the capital jury is of such
importance to the integrity and continued vitality of the American system of
justice that it cannot be seriouslyargued that a religiouslytainted verdict does not
amount to government endorsement of religion. Allowing the jury's verdict to
stand with evidence that it was Biblically influenced is tacit "sponsorship" of
religion. If a delegation of governmental authority to a religious group can be
invalidated on Establishment Clause grounds, then the delegation of governmen-
tal authority to a jury must be subject to the same scrutiny."8 7
D. A wi4 Lemon: Prim Fade Viation
Occasionally, the United States Supreme Court refuses to apply the Lemn
or endorsement test to an alleged Establishment Clause violation. Instead, the
Court found the challenged action to be inconsistent on its face with traditional
Establishment Clause principles." 9 In L&- u Weini; the Court found that a
prayer given by a rabbi which preceded a graduation ceremony represented
pervasive government involvement in religious activity"to the point of creating
a state-sponsored and state-directed religious exercise in a public school."'91
Further, the Court held that "[t]he principle that govenment mayaccommodate
the free exercise of religion does not supersede the fundamental limitations
imposed bythe Establishment Clause." 92
Unlike prayer at the opening of every Congressional legislative session,
using the Bible or other religious texts during jurydeliberations is not part of the
"unique history" of the United States justice system, and is thus not exempt from
the application of traditional Establishment Clause principles like those from
186. See, eg, Bd qcfEduc f Kniysw Joel Vl Sd Dist, 512 U.S. at 710 (invalidating state
delegation of authority to religious sect because statute was not religion-neutral); Nyst, 413 U.S.
at 792-93 (A proper respect for both the Free Exercise and the Establishment Clauses compels
the State to pursue a course of 'neutrality' toward religion."); Lakin, 459 U.S. at 125-26 ([The
mere appearance of a joint exercise of legislative authority by Church and State provides a signifi-
cant symbolic benefit to religion in the minds of some by reason of the power conferred.").
187. See Bd qcEdc fKiw Joe Vi S& Dit, 512 U.S. at 710 (invalidating state delegation
of authority to religious sect because statute was not religion-neutra).
188. Sw eg, Lee, 505 U.S. at 586 ("This case does not require us to revisit the difficult
questions dividing us in recent cases, questions of the definition and full scope of the principles
governing the extent of permitted accommodation bythe State for the religious beliefs and practices
of many of its citizens.").
189. Id at 598.
190. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
191. Lee, 505 US. at 587.
192. Id
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Lee.93 The Court in both Lee and Santa Fe Inkpeniat Sdxd Distrit v DW94
recognized that a primarypurpose of the Establishment Clause is to prohibit the
coerced religious participation of those who do not wish to participate" 5 The
defendant on trial for capital murder is not only coerced into participating, but
is required to participate and accept punishment from a jury that formulates a
decision around a religious dogma found in religious text. A defendant should
be able to challenge a religion-based verdict by citing his inability to avoid the
infliction of the religious punishment imposed by the jury. Even the four
members of the current Supreme Court who believe there must be a finding of
coercion should recognize the unacceptable result of a death sentence grounded
on religious principle.
E. Hamifs Beyrdia Reascasle Daubd
Whether or not an Establishment Clause violation is grounds for reversal
of conviction depends on whether the reviewing court finds that the error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.9 It is incumbent upon the State to
overcome this burden. 97 Although the Chp=n standard is applied for other
constitutional violations, when raising a tainted verdict claim under the Establish-
ment Clause it should be much more difficult for the State to prove that the
error was harmless'98 In cases in which the claim involves an improper closing
argument, the consideration of prejudicial evidence, or other guilt phase issues,
the determination of whether the error was harmless can be negated bya show-
ing that the evidence of guilt was already overwhelming.' 99  In SattmnAte v
Texas,2°° the United States Supreme Court recognized this fact and stated:
193. SeeSimson & Garvey, s"pra note 88, at 1126; Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783,790-91
(1983) (finding that prayer preceding the opening of a congressional session was not a violation of
the Establishment Clause).
194. 530 US. 290 (2000).
195. SwLee, 505 U.S. at 594 ("Tjhe government mayno more use social pressure to enforce
orthodoxy than it mayuse more direct means."); Santa Fe Iap. Sd.A Dist, 530 US. at 312 ("The
constitutional command will not permit the District 'to exact religious conformity from a student
as the price' of joining her classmates at a varsity football game." (quoting Lee, 505 US. at 596)).
196. See C6nw 386 U.S. at 24 ("[W]e hold. .. that before a federal constitutional error can
be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.").
197. Id This standard is more lenient than the State-friendly standard used in federal habeas
corpus proceedings, which requires that the State show that the error did not have a "substantial
and in us effect or influence in determining the jur/s verdict." Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 US.
619, 623 (1993).
198. Se, eg, Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 US. 249, 256-58 (1988) (applying harmless-error
doctrine in a capital case involving a Sixth Amendment violation).
199. Id at 256.
200. 486 U.S. 249 (1988).
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In the normal case where a harmless-error rule is applied, the error
occurs at trial and its scope is readily identifiable. Accordingly, the
reviewing court can undertake with some confidence its relatively
narrow task of assessing the likelihood that the error materially af-
fected the deliberations of the jury.
20 1
In other words, there are countervailing considerations that can be presented to
the reviewing court from the guilt phase record to showthat the outcome would
or would not have been different without the constitutional error.
In contrast, during sentencing proceedings, the factors to be considered are
not susceptible to the same type of weighing as the guilt phase evidence because
there is no record of the jurydeliberations. Even in untainted jury deliberations,
at sentencing an independent weighing of the aggravating and mitigating factors
bythe court is not possible. Moreover, byrule, whether common law or statu-
tory, the trial or reviewing court may not inquire into the basis of the jury's
decision, but only into whether the jurors considered outside material. 2 This
limitation prevents the court from creating a record following challenged pro-
ceedings. The State has a nearlyimpossible burden to showbeyond a reasonable
doubt that the jury deliberations, as conducted, were not prejudicial to the
defendant. This difficulty should render the inclusion of religious texts per se
prejudicial.
VI Coiz! in
It is essential that the jury not be allowed to consult the Bible or any other
religious text in the confines of the juryroom during capital sentencing delibera-
tions. The consultation of the Bible can lead to the justification and imposition
of death without the jury giving due weight and consideration to the evidence
and law governing a particular case. Defense counsel should be vigilant at trial
as well, constantly on guard during all phases of a capital trial to ward off the
injection of religiously charged rhetoric or material that may prejudice the jury
against the defendant. Traditional attacks against verdicts predicated on the
consideration of extraneous material by the jury may often times be ineffective
due to the ability of the prosecution to rebut the presumption of prejudice. If
so, a reliance on the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment may repre-
sent an increased chance for obtaining a newtrial or new sentencing proceeding.
201. SaueAe, 486 U.S. at 256 (quoting Hollowayv. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475,490-91(1978)).
202. SwFED.PK EViD. 606(b) (governing the inquiryinto whether ajury considered improper
material or was the subject of coercion); GrteIar Traaor Ca, 353 S.E.2d at 751 ( Generally, we
have limited findings of prejudicial juror misconduct to activities of jurors that occur outside the
juryroom."); Evm.Srnith, 361 S.E2d at 446 (restating Virginia law concerning extraneous material
and noting an exception allowed for determining whether the jury considered extraneous materiaD.
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